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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BARBARA ANN PAINTER
Plaintiff—Respondent
Civil No. 870317-CA
Category No. 14b

vs.
JAMES RANDALL PAINTER
Defendant—Appellant

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment, June 25, 1987
Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab County
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is

conferred

on

the Utah

Court

of

Appeals

pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3g (1987).
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The
complaint

Plaintiff—Respondent,
against

the

Barbara

Ann

Painter,

Defendant—Appellant,

James

filed

a

Randall

Painter, seeking a divorce (R. 1-5). The Defendant by his Answer
and Counterclaim (R. 20-23, 206-209) also sought a divorce.
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Juab County on the 25th of June, 1987, granting
to the Plaintiff a decree of divorce from the Defendant (R* 283287).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal as directed by the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure on the 23rd of July, 1987 (R. 290-291).
1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions relevant to the determination of
the present case are found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and in Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code
Annotated.

Relevant portions are reproduced in Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OP THE CASE

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 23, 1968 in
Nephi, Utah and separated in March of 1986.

They are and have

been residents of Juab County, State of Utah, for more than three
months prior to this action.

Defendant treated Plaintiff cruelly

causing her mental distress and suffering (R. 1-2, 253-54, 275).
They have four minor children; Aaron Painter, Mario Painter,
Benjamin Painter, and MeLea Painter.

The court awarded custody

and control of the minor children, MeLea and Benjamin, to the
Plaintiff
Defendant

subject

to

reasonable

(R. 254, 275).

visitation

rights

by

the

The Court interviewed the two oldest

sons pursuant to a stipulcition entered into by the parties (R.
271,

288-89).

arranged

Thereafter,

for a subsequent

the

Plaintiff

contacted

the Court,

interview of the children, and the

Court re-interviewed them without notice to the Defendant or his
counsel (R. 271, 288-89).

Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded

joint custody of Aaron and Mario with the principal place of
residence being with Plaintiff.

Aaron and Mario are to live six

months of the year with Defendant so long as both parties reside
in Nephi; however, should
Plaintiff

shall

have

either party move from Nephi, then

custody

of

Aaron

and

Mario

subject

reasonable visitation rights by the Defendant (R. 254, 275-76).
2

to

The Court found the Defendant to be able-bodied and employed
by Painter Motor Company, earning in excess of $2,000 per month.
It was ordered that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $160 per
month per child in her care and custody and provide health and
accident insurance on the minor children.
from

paying

the

child

support

custody of Aaron and Mario.

during

Defendant was excused

the

six months he ;has

Also, the Court found Plaintiff in

need of alimony and Defendant capable of paying $450 per month.
Defendant is to pay all obligations incurred during the marriage,
including any amount owed on the Riviera automobile, except for
Plaintiff's obligation for any amount due or to become due on the
family home mortgage (R. 254-55, 276-77).
The Court ordered the following division of property

(R.

254-56, 276-79, 280-81):
To Plaintiff
a.

Exclusive possession of the family home having an
appraised value of $76,000 less the mortgage of
$24,409.70, with each party being awarded one-half of
the equity therein, based upon the 1987 values.

b.

The $7,000 lot and $ 8,736.51 remaining cash in the
retirement fund.

c.

One-half of the proceeds from the lot valued at $6,000
to be sold immediately.

d.

The 1983 Riviera automobile with Defendant required to
make necessary arrangements to secure clear title.

e.

One-half of the household furnishing. Plaintiff shall
prepare two lists of said property and shall provide
the lists to the Defendant, who shall select the list
of property he wishes to have. The remaining list of
property shall belong to the Plaintiff.

fe

Attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,500 to
bear an interest rate of 12% per annum until paid.

3

To Defendant
a.

One-half of the present equity in the family home.

b.

The Painter Family Limited Partnership
Motor Company stock interests.

c.

One-half of the proceeds from the lot valued at $6,000.

d.

One-half of the household furnishing.

On March

18, 1986, the trial

and

Painter

court issued a restraining

order which restrained both parties from "disposing of any of the
real property, personal property, business propeirty or investment
property, money or funds belonging to the parties . . . ."
Court ruled

that the Defendant violated

The

that order by making

payments to Zions First National Bank for $15,460.27

(business

loan); to Painter Motor for $3,085.08 (pay advance); to Painter
Motor Insurance for $1,622.48 (loan); to First Security Bank for
$1,589.87 (loan); and to Honda for $2,456.28 (motorcycles).

The

Court ruled that Defendant's payments to the IRS and State Tax
Commission were appropriate.
in the retirement
made.

The parties had accumulated $36,688

fund from which the payments described were

After the Court's allowance for the tax payments, it ruled

that the retirement fund should have had $32,950.59 remaining.
Therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to half

($16,475.30) of the

retirement fund, satisfied by the $7,000 lot and the remaining
$8,736.51 cash (R. 255-56, 277-78, 390-93).
In

addition,

the

court

awarded

the

motorcycles

to

the

children, and Defendant is to assume any remaining obligations
due thereon

(R. 255, 277).

children exclusively

Further, those items used by the

(bedroom sets) are not to be considered as

the marital property for division (R. 256, 278-79).
4

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
This

court

should

rule

for

the

Defendant—Appellant

by

reversing the trial court's following decisions.
First, the record indicates that the obligations paid by the
Defendant with retirement fund monies were marital obligations,
incurred before separation (R. 390-93).
should

equitably

divided

these

debts

Accordingly, the court
and

should

specifically

explain the reasons for their division. In failing to do so, the
trial court did not distribute the assets equitably.
Second, equity requires that the trial court clearly specify
that the Limited Partnership and Painter Motor stock interests
were the Defendant's separate property.

The trend in Utah, and

other states, has been to award a spouse's separate property to
the

spouse

outside

of

the

marital

assets

unless

adequate

justification could be shown for dividing the separate property.
Third, the trial court violated the defendant's rights to
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
when it interviewed the two oldest boys on the request of the
plaintiff without notifying the defendant (R. 288-89).

Also, the

Utah Supreme Court ruled in Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994
(Utah 1986), that the reasons for giving custody to one parent
over another must be specifically stated to be upheld on appeal.
Fourth, following the decision in Izatt v. Izatt. 627 P. 2d
49 (Utah 1981), the court should consider the difference between
Plaintiff's separate property, the Cordoba's value, and the cost
of the Riviera as a marital obligation, and as such, equity would
require that it be divided between the parties.
5

ARGUMENT
X.

EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR THE
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS PAID.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1)

(Supp. 1987) states, "When a decree of

divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property and parties. . . ."
trial

court

has

generally

great

latitude

and

While the

discretion

in

determining what is equitable, Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781
(Utah 1986); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 81 296 P.2d 977,
979 (1956) stated that a marital termination settlement should be
just and equitable and failure to so be would require the Court
to substitute its own findings and judgments in the interest of
justice and equity.
see,

Berger

v.

Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978);

Berger,

713

P. 2d

695

(Utah

1985);

Watson v.

Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977).
A.

The obligations paid
marital obligations.

from

the

retirement

fund

were

The Utah Supreme Court in Humphreys v. Humphreys. 520 P. 2d
193 (Utah 1974) , recognized and held that its duty in a divorce
case

is to

review

facts

as well

as law.

In so doing, the

Defendant, James Randall Painter, contends that in reviewing the
record, this Court should reasonably determine that all of the
debts

paid

by

the

Defendant,

(R.

255-56,

277-78)

using

the

retirement fund, were marital debts incurred prior to separation
with the exception of the motorcycles purchased by the Defendant
for his sons

(R. 390-393) .

The amount of the retirement fund

used for the motorcycles was $2,456.28 (R. 393).
6

While the Defendant states that he did not tell Plaintiff
about some of the obligations incurred by him (R. 398-400) , the
Supreme Court of Utah in Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986),
held that evidence regarding a wife's knowledge that her husband
was operating a business was sufficient to support finding that
husband did not hide or secrete marital assets in violation of
restraining order or rights of wife.

The Defendant's situation

is very similar in this case in that he may have incurred the
debts without

the

Plaintiff's

specific knowledge, but by her

receiving a monthly check for household expenses (R. 3 04), it can
be reasonably assumed that Plaintiff did know that Defendant was
overseeing the business of bringing money home for the benefit of
his

family,

which

business

might

include

incurring

loans

or

investments in areas such as mining futures.

These investments

would

which

produce

profits

and

losses,

both

of

should

be

considered marital assets or liabilities.
B.

Marital obligations should be divided equitably.

The Plaintiff pleaded by her complaint

(R. 1-5)

and the

Defendant admitted by his answer (R. 20-23) and counterclaim (R.
206-09)

that

an

equitable

distribution

of

obligations

and

liabilities should be made as provided under U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1).
In addition to Gill in Utah, other jurisdictions have ruled
that marital obligations should be divided to insure equity.

For

example, in Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978),
the court stated that there should be an equal distribution of
campaign debts between husband and wife incurred by the husband.
See also Fredericksen v. Fredericksen, 185 Mont. 548, 605 P.2d
7

1135 (1980).

Also, in Alaska, Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802

(Ak. 1986), the court ruled that where the trial court failed to
divide or at least explain its reason for not dividing debt owed
to husband's father, owed to credit card accounts, and settlement
money received from condominium vendor, there was no indication
that the trial court had considered husband's situation and its
ruling was clearly unjust.
should

be

applied

to the

The decision in the Burcell case
case before

this court

in that no

explanation was given by the trial court as to why credit was not
allowed to the Defendant for paying marital obligations.

The

trial court only states that it gave the matter consideration (R.
288-89) which is insufficient under Burcell.

Id,,

Given that the trial court did not state its reasons for
failing

to

give

credit

for

Defendant's

payment

of

marital

liabilities, three possible assumptions can be made as to the
trial court's reasoning.

First, it can be assumed that the trial

court's language indicates that it feels the debts paid were only
those of the Defendant (R. 255-56, 289), but the caes cited would
clearly indicate that such a philosophy is unjust and should be
reversed.

A second assumption might be that the court considered

the marital obligations paid by the Defendant and concluded that
equity would encourage him to pay for all of them.
Wyoming, Smith v. Smith, 704 P.2d

1319

However, in

(Wyo. 1985), the court

ruled that child support, alimony, division of property and other
financial matters must be considered together in making a just
and equitable disposition of family assets.

In considering these

criteria in the present case, it is apparent that the trial court
8

awarded liberal alimony and custody payments totally $1090 (R.
276) per month or about 67% of the Defendant's stated take-home
pay of $1,543 per month after taxes (R. 335), and it would be
unjust

to not

approximate

a

50 percent

property

division

in

regards to these debts as was done with the majority of the
assets

(R. 254-56, 276-79, 280-81).

A final assumption may be

that because of Defendant's violation of the injunction against
dispersing marital assets, the trial court awarded the Plaintiff
an unequitable amount of marital assets to penalize Defendant.
However, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705

(Utah 1982), the

Supreme Court allowed for the property settlement to remain in
spite of the wife's contempt.
trial

court

should

have

The Court stated that while the

adjudicated

some consequence

for the

contempt, it wasn't going to change the property settlement per
se.

In the Defendant's case, no consequences were specifically

stated in the record as adjudication for the contempt.

If the

trial court penalized the Defendant for his contempt, it should
be stated and be appropriate in comparison to the harm done.
To summarize, the obligations paid for by the Defendant with
the

retirement

fund

were

marital

obligations

having

before separation, except for the motorcycle purchases *

occurred
As such

and given the other liberal provisions of the divorce degree,
equity requires that the Defendant receive credit for payment of
these debts. Accordingly, Defendant should be entitled to half of
the $7,000 lot and the remainder of the cash after Plaintiff gets
half the $2,456.28

(motorcycles) + $8,736.51

(cash).

In other

words, Defendant should receive 8,736.51 - 5,596.40 = $3,140.11.
9

II.

EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE DEPENDANT'S LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND
PAINTER MOTOR STOCK INTERESTS SHOULD BE RULED AS SEPARATE
ASSETS.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as a broad proposition

that property subject to division upon divorce encompasses all
assets

of

every

nature

possessed

by

the

obtained and from whatever source derived.

parties,

whenever

Encrlert v. Englert,

576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978); see also Hamilton v. Hamilton,
562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977).

However, there is a possible exception

which involves the acquisition of property by a spouse during
marriage through gift or inheritance.
Generally, this exception is that property acquired by gift
or inheritance requires that some justification, such as the kind
or

source

of property,

length of marriage, or

if the

family

helped in the property's growth or acquisition, be found before
giving any interest in such asset to the non-recipient spouse.
With this exception, courts can deal with the varying equitable
issues related to the overall property and support provisions
being made for the family.

See, Preston, 646 P.2d at 706.

example, in Preston, even though husband performed

For

some legal

services and other work, regarding property inherited by his wife
during the marriage, wife's inheritance was not acquired through
joint efforts of the parties and thus, in divorce action, wife
was entitle to the inheritance as her separate property.

Id. ;

see also, Joraensen v. Joraensen, 667 P.2d 22 (Utah 1983).
As such, the trend, in most cases decided before the Utah
Supreme Court, has been to award a spouse's separate property to
the

spouse

outside

of

the

marital
10

assets

unless

adequate

justification could be shown for dividing the separate property.
For example in Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
the court gave to each party their separate assets which included
paternal family partnerships, inherited property, and gifts from
parents.

See Searle v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); see

also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) (equity may require
that any appreciation of inherited property not become part of
the marital estate).
Other jurisdictions have been split on whether to hold a
gift

or

inheritance

acquired

by

a

spouse

during marriage

as

martial property and subject to equitable distribution along with
other assets.

In Florida, as in Utah, the rule is generally that

a gift or inheritance is part of the marital assets if adequate
justification exists.

Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 3rd

DCA

the

1980).

However,

Illinois

Supreme

Court

ruled

in a

leading case on this subject that property which is acquired for
example

by

gift

or

inheritance

property because demonstrably

is deemed

to

be

non-marital

it was not obtained through any

joint enterprise of the spouse but through an independent source.
In Re Marriage of Komnick, 84 111. 2d 89, 417 N.E.2d 1305 (1981).
Finally, in Washington, the court ruled that in making a property
division,

the

court

must

bear

in mind

correct

community

or

separate property status for property to be divided and failure
to do so constitutes reversible error.

Pollock v. Pollock, 7

Wash. App. 394, 499 P.2d 213 (1972).
It appears that the key point in most jurisdictions is for a
court to be equitable in divorce decrees.
11

And equity can not be

satisfied if there is no value placed on where the asset came
from,

length

of

marriage,

maintenance and growth.
equity

requires

that

or

family

help

in

Preston, 646 P.2d at 706.
the

Defendant

be

the

assets

In this case,

explicitly

given

his

Limited Partnership and Painter Motor stock interests as separate
property because of the facts that they were gifts and that the
Plaintiff was not required to invest her energies to maintain or
help these assets grow. (R. 340-43).
III. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS OP DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ARE VIOLATED IN REGARDS TO
CUSTODY.
Under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

"due process" emphasizes

fairness between the state and the individual dealing with the
state, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation
may

be

treated;

treatment

by

situations

a

"equal
state

are arguably

usually arise together.

protection"
between

emphasizes

classes

of

indistinguishable.

disparity

individuals

in

whose

In addition, both

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600.

When the custody of a child is at issue, while the court is
entitled

to

interview

the

child

privately,

it

is

reversible

error, or a grave impropriety, for the trial court to fail to
disclose

to

one

of

the

parties,

what

occurred

during

the

interview, since the parties should be afforded an opportunity to
rebut any statements made in the private interview.
Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840.

Douglas v.

Furthermore, courts have

held that notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential to
due process of law and have not hesitated to strike orders that
violate party's rights.

Paronto v. Armstrong, 161 Kan. 720, 171
12

P.2d 299 (1946).

See also, Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292,

552 P.2d 979 (1976) (due process requires reasonable notice even
in the absence of an express statutory provision requiring such
notice).

In the case before this court, the trial court admits

to having interviewed the two oldest children at the request of
the Plaintiff and without notice to the Defendant or his counsel
(R. 288-89).

This

is in strict violation

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment's right to due process as explained in the decisions
above and to equal protection in that the Plaintiff had notice of
the private interview while the Defendant did not.
Furthermore, in this case, the court did not state in the
record on what basis it found that the custody arrangement was in
the "best interests" (R. 289) of the children.
of

Utah

declaring

has

held

that

that the trial

one

parent

should

court's
have

The Supreme Court

practice

custody

of

over

simply
another

without specifically showing or explaining why that conclusion
was

reached

cannot

challenged on appeal.

pass

muster

when

the

custody

award

is

Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994 (Utah

1986); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986).
For these reasons, it should be found that the trial court
violated Defendant's rights to due process and equal protection,
and furthermore, that the court failed to specifically state its
reasons for granting custody to the Plaintiff.

As a result, the

custody arrangement should be reversed with prejudice and a new
custody trial ordered.
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IV.

EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE AUTOMOBILE SHOULD NOT BE PROVIDED
TO THE PLAINTIFF "FREE AND CLEAR".
In Izatt v, Izatt. 627 P. 2d 49

Court

held

that

where

a wife

(Utah 1981), the Supreme

obtained

separate

property

of

$97,000 through a malpractice suit, subject to some outstanding
debt to her husband's family, she and her husband would both be
required to pay one-half of the debt.

The Court's rationale was

that since the debt was incurred directly for the support of the
family

to

heal

the

wife

of

her

injuries

it

was

a

marital

obligation, in spite of the fact that the debt was on the wife's
separate property assets.
In the case before this court, the Plaintiff, like in Izatt,
indisputably had an asset, a Cordoba automobile, that would be
considered her separate property

(R. 327) .

However, when the

Defendant brought home the Riviera automobile for her use (R.
3 27) , and as its use directly benefited the family, then the
difference between Plaintiff's separate property equity in the
Cordoba

and

the

outstanding

loan

considered a marital obligation.

on

the

Riviera

should

be

Furthermore, as explained in

Argument I, under Smith, 704 P.2d at 1319, the court ruled that
alimony,

child

considered

support,

and

financial

matters

must

be

in determining a just and equitable disposition of

assets and/or liabilities.
that the

other

As mentioned, the Defendant contends

trial court was liberal

in the alimony

and

custody

payment requirements, and as such, it would be unequitable to
require

the

Defendant to assume more than 50 percent

of the

marital obligation of providing the automobile "free and clear".
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CONCLUSION
The

Defendant—Appellant,

James

Randall

Painter,

respectfully requests that the portions of the trial court's
property

settlement which grant to Plaintiff—Respondent

the

remainder of the retirement fund and the entire $7,000 lot, which
do not specifically consider Defendant's Limited Partnership and
Painter Motor stock interests as separate assets, and which
require Defendant to provide the Riviera automobile "free and
clear" should be reversed as inequitable for the reasons stated.
Additionally, the Defendant—Appellant,
trial

court

protection

violated
in

regards

his

rights

to

custody

to
of

due

alleges that the
process

his

two

and

equal

oldest

boys.

Furthermore, the trial court failed to specifically state its
reasons for the custody arrangement provided.

As such, the trial

court's custody arrangement should be reversed with prejudice and
a new custody trial ordered.
Respectively submitted this

,^^6/day of November, 1987.

Harris and Carter

(laceA i\
Mi

Michael J. Petro
Attorney for Defendant—Appellant
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ADDENDUM

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Fourteenth Amendment § 1, U.S. Constitution
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
Untied States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1987): Disposition of Property, etc.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable order relating to the children,
property, and parties. . . .

